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Abstract
The short-run non-neutrality of money and its implications for inﬂation dynamics are examined
in a monetary search economy with heterogenous agents. Lump-sum money injections aﬀect the
distribution of money holdings in equilibrium and thus generate short-run non-neutrality. The
response of prices and inﬂation to shocks of this type depends on the changes in households’ search
intensity that they induce. Monetary shocks change the distribution of prices in equilibrium and
thus alter the returns to search. The resulting changes in optimal search intensity aﬀect sellers’
proﬁt maximizing markups and thus may result in sluggish price adjustment and persistent inﬂation
despite the absence of restrictions on sellers’ ability to set prices in every period.
¤ We thank Chris Waller and participants at the 2005 Vienna Macroeconomics Workshop for comments. yDepart-
ment of Economics, Queen’s University; Kingston, ON; Canada K7L 3N6.1. Introduction
In this paper, we examine short-run monetary non-neutrality and the dynamics of both prices
and inﬂation using a monetary search economy with heterogeneous agents. In our economy, short-
run non-neutrality results as lump-sum monetary injections, whether anticipated or not, change the
distribution of money holdings across households and aﬀect real allocations. The degree of price
adjustment in response to such shocks and the resulting dynamics of inﬂation are driven by the
changes that they induce in housholds’ search intensity. Monetary shocks aﬀect the distribution of
wealth and thus have diﬀerential eﬀects on agents’ returns to search. Changes in search intensity
in turn aﬀect sellers’ market power and thus induce them to change their markups, aﬀecting the
magnitude of the contemporaneous response of prices to the shock. Moreover, as even transitory
shocks result in persistent movements of the distribution of money holdings across households, the
responses of search intensity and the price movements they generate are persistent as well.
Our research contributes to the large literature on monetary non-neutrality and the dynamics
of inﬂation, much of which is aimed at developing practical models of monetary policy (see e.g.
Woodford (2003) and the references therein). In most of this literature monetary non-neutrality
is eﬀectively assumed as restrictions are imposed on ﬁrms ability to change prices in response
to shocks. This is typically justiﬁed as being in accordance with empirical evidence that the
contemporaneous response of prices to such shocks (and to real shocks as well) is muted (e.g. Gali
and Gertler (1999)). This is often interpreted as “price stickiness” and modeled accordingly with
timing restrictions and/or costs associated with price changes.
Our economy, in contrast, has no restrictions on sellers ability to change their prices. Short-run
monetary non-neutrality stems instead from the wealth eﬀects of unequal monetary transfers to
heterogenous households. Non-neutrality of this sort is studied in search models also by Berentsen,
Camera, and Waller (2004), Molico (2005), and Williamson (2004). Sluggish price adjustment arises
from the eﬀect that both contemporaneous changes in the distribution of money across households
and changes in households’ expected future values of money aﬀect the distribution of prices and
thus the return to search. In equilibrium our economy thus may exhibit a form of price stickiness
emanating not from exogenous restrictions on the ability of sellers to change prices, but rather from
the eﬀects of changes in search intensity on their market power and desire to do so.
We incorporate the posted-price selling mechanism of Burdett and Judd (1983) and Head and
Kumar (2005) into a dynamic model with heterogenous households similar to those studied by Head
and Shi (2003) and Williamson (2005). In general, in our economy a higher than anticipated increase
1(decrease) in the growth rate of money raises (lowers) the degree of price dispersion. Changes in
dispersion aﬀect the returns to search and thus increase (decrease) search intensity. This lowers
(raises) ﬁrms desired markups and so may result in a reduction (increase) of real prices. If real
prices fall in response to a monetary shock, then nominal prices must rise by less than the money
stock. We refer to incomplete contemporaneous adjustment of prices to changes in the quantity of
money as price stickiness, and we focus on the adjustment of both the price level and inﬂation rate
over time.
Because dynamics result from the wealth eﬀects of diﬀerential money transfers, some aspects
of our results are similar to those obtained in studies using “limited participation” models (e.g.
Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2002) and Chiu (2005). Unlike these models, however, in ours there
is no portfolio allocation problem associated with the demand for money. Rather, our model is
more closely related to those of Williamson (2004, 2005) and Head and Shi (2003) in that money
shocks directly aﬀect the distribution of money holdings across households. Movements in this
distribution aﬀect both prices and the rate at which money ﬂows from households of one type to
another.
In an earlier paper, Head, Kumar, and Lapham (2005) consider a stochastic model similar in
many respects but diﬀerent in that households are always identical. In that model the distribution
of money holdings across households is always degenerate and monetary shocks have no eﬀect on
the distribution of wealth. Thus, money is neutral in both the short and long run. That paper focus
on the non-superneutrality of money and thus does not speak to the issue of dynamics in response
to transitory shocks. Here we allow households to be heterogeneous to a limited degree. As in both
Head and Shi (2003) and Williamson (2005), however, the distribution of money holdings across
households in a stationary equilibrium may be described by a low dimension vector. This is crucial
in enabling us to analyze dynamics in response to aggregate shocks.
This version of the paper is very preliminary and is circulated only for discussion purposes.
In the next section we describe the environment. In section 3 we deﬁne a particular class of
stationary monetary equilibrium and present some results characterizing its basic features. Section 4
contains some examples illustrating the dynamics that can arise from both transitory and persistent
monetary shocks. Section 5 outlines the remaining work to be done. Proofs of propositions are in




Time is discrete with an inﬁnite horizon. There are H ¸ 3 non-storable goods which may be
produced and consumed. In a manner similar to that employed by Head and Shi (2003), the world
is comprised of two equally sized groups of households who we will refer to as type 1 and type 2
households.1 All households in each of these two groups are symmetric in all respects except with
regard to the goods they produce and consume. Within each type there unit measures of H ¸ 3
diﬀerent sub-types of household. Regardless of type (1 or 2), a sub-type h household produces good
h and derives utility only from consuming good h+1, modulo H. All households, regardless of type
or sub-type, are comprised of unit measures each of two diﬀerent kinds of members: buyers and
sellers. Individual household members do not have independent preferences and do not undertake
independent actions. Rather, they act only on instructions from the household.
Let types be indexed by i = 1;2, Consider a household of any sub-type, h 2 f1;:::;Hg,
belonging to type i. This is without loss of generality, since sub-types are entirely symmetric.
Members of this household who are sellers may produce good h at constant disutility Áit utils per
unit at time t. Production costs are stochastic, and in each time period all sellers from households
of type i have the same cost. Let Áit 2 fÁL;ÁM;ÁHg for all i and t. Also suppose that Áit evolves
via a discrete Markov Chain with
Prob[Áit+1 = Á0jÁit = Á] ´ ¼Á(Á0;Á) i = 1;2; 8t: (2:1)
Let yit denote the total quantity produced by the sellers of a type i household (of any sub-type) at
time t. Then this household’s total disutility from production in period t is equal to Áityit.
Members of this household who are buyers observe individually random numbers of price quotes
and may purchase good h+1 at the lowest price that they observe. Each period, all buyers observe
a single price quote without cost. Additional price quotes arrive at each buyer at Poisson rate nit,
where this arrival rate is common across buyers and chosen by the household. At the end of a unit
interval of time, each buyer is able to recall and purchase at the lowest price observed individually.
Increases in the arrival rate of additional price quotes is subject to a proportional utility cost, ¹.
In period t, if a household’s buyers observe additional prices at rate nit, then its search costs for
that period are equal to ¹nit.
1 The extension to L types is logically straightforward but both notationally and numerically complex.
3The price posted by an individual seller is observable only by buyers of a particular type.
We will think of buyers of a particular type and sub-type congregating in a particular “home”
market or location. Sellers of the same type may post prices in the home market/location of the
appropriate sub-type without cost. If they want their prices to be available to buyers of the other
type, however, they must “travel” to these buyers’ location at a cost. Households choose measures
of sellers which target diﬀerent types of buyers. We assume that there is fraction of sellers that
were originally chosen to target each type of buyer. Let ¯ zi;¡i denote the fraction of type i sellers
originally designated to sell in the other market (¡i). Note that ¯ zi
i = 0 for i = 1;2 is a possibility.
Deviations from having measure ¯ zi;¡i of sellers targeting “foreign” buyers result in adjustment costs
of the following form:
Z(zi;¡it) = »(zi;¡it ¡ ¯ zi;¡i)º; º ¸ 1; » ¸ 0; (2:2)
where the case of zero adjustment cost may be attained by setting » = 0.
All households have identical preferences over their preferred good. A representative type i






¯t [u(cit) ¡ Áityit ¡ »(zi;¡it ¡ ¯ zi;¡i)º ¡ ¹nit]
#
: (2:3)
The household’s period utility equals that which it receives from consumption of goods purchased by
its buyers minus the production disutility incurred by its sellers and its search costs. Consumption
utility is given by u(cit) where cit is the total purchase of good h+1 by the household’s buyers. For
all types and in all time periods, u(¢) is strictly increasing and concave with limc!0 u0
c(c)c = 1. In





; ® > 1; i = 1;2: (2:4)
Since goods are non-storable and a sub-type h household produces good h and consumes
good h + 1, a double coincidence of wants between memebers of any two households is impossible.
Moreover, it is assumed that households of a give sub-type (regardless of type) are anonymous.
As a result, direct exchanges of goods cannot be mutually beneﬁcial. Thus, we focus on exchange
facilitated by the existence of perfectly durable and intrinsically worthless ﬁat money. A household
may acquire money by producing and selling goods to buyers of other households. The money may
then be used by the household’s buyers to acquire the appropriate consumption good in future
periods.
4In the initial period (t = 0) all households are endowed with M0 units of ﬁat money. The per
household stock of this money is denoted Mt for each t. At the beginning of each period t ¸ 1,
households receive a common lump-sum transfer, (°t ¡ 1)Mt¡1, of new units of ﬁat money from a
central “monetary authority”. Thus, the per household money stock evolves as follows:
Mt+1 = °tMt: (2:5)
The money growth rate is stochastic, and like the cost parameters Á1 and Á2, follows a Markov
chain with ° 2 f°L;°M;°Hg and
Prob[°t+1 = °0j°t = °] ´ ¼°(°0;°) i = 1;2; 8t: (2:6)
It is useful for notational purposes to deﬁne the vector ¾t = (Á1t;Á2t;°t), of exogenous stochas-
tic parameters. Since both Á and ° are independently and identically distributed across both types
and time, using (2.1) and (2.6) we may deﬁne a time invariant probability distribution over the
twenty-seven possible values of ¾.
The ﬁnal component of our environment which we describe here is the timing of events within
a period. At the beginning of period t, all households observe the state of the economy and have











In (2.7) we introduce the notation, Mi, i = 1;2 which without a time subscript will be used to
denote type i households’ share of the aggregate money stock in the current period.
The household chooses the rate at which its buyers observe additional price quotes and issues
instructions to both its buyers and sellers. The buyers and sellers then split up for a trading session,
the details of which will be described below. After trading, the individual members return to their
respective households; buyers with their goods purchases and unspent money balances (if any),
and sellers with their sales receipts in ﬁat money. These balances are then augmented with next
period’s transfer to become the household’s individual holdings at the beginning of the next period,
mt+1.
2.2. The current period trading session
Before analyzing the household’s dynamic optimization problem, it is useful to describe the
trading session of the current period. In so doing we will take as given households’ money holdings
and valuations of money carried into the next period, as both of these are determined before the
5start of the trading session. For expositional purposes we will suppress time subscripts wherever
possible in this section.2
In each period, trade for each consumption good takes place in two distinct markets, each
associated with buyers from households of a particular type. All buyers at each location are
identical. Sellers of the appropriate sub-type may be directed by their household to sell at either
location. Thus, it is possible that a location, while it contains only buyers of one particular type,
may contain sellers from more than one type. It is, however, costly to travel to any location
other than that containing buyers from the same type and therefore it is also possible that certain
locations will contain only sellers of one type, or no sellers at all.
In each market, sellers post ﬁat money prices at which they are willing to sell their good for
ﬁat money. Buyers (again of type i households) observe a single price quote with certainty, and
additional quotes which arrive at Poisson rate ni for a unit interval of time. At the end of this
period of search, buyers can recall all of their received price quotes and may purchase at the lowest
price they have observed. Alternatively, they may not purchase at all and return to the household
with their money holdings unspent.
We treat the household’s choices regarding the current trading session in two stages. To begin
with, we ﬁx both the Poisson arrival rate of additional price quotes to buyers and the measures of
sellers visiting the diﬀerent market/locations. Holding these ﬁxed, we consider households’ choices
of trading instructions to its individual buyers and sellers. We then return to the problems of search
intensity and the allocation of sellers across locations. This two-stage separation is appropriate
because trade takes place only at the end of the search interval. Note that because it is not until
this time that the household knows either the number of prices observed by individual buyers or
the number of times a given seller’s posted price has been observed, it has no incentive to treat
either buyers or sellers asymmetrically. For this reason we assume that households distribute money
holdings equally to all buyers and issue to the same instructions to all buyers and to all sellers.
Denote the probability with which a buyer of a type i household observes k ¸ 1 additional





k ¸ 1; (2:8)
2 Speciﬁcally, real variables, by which we mean probabilities and quantities, will be written without time sub-
scripts whereas we will keep the time subscript on nominal quantities including distributions (i.e. cdf’s) of
nominal prices.
6Since the household contains a unit measure of buyers, all of whom receive price quotes at the same
rate, for any k, qik may also be interpreted as the measure of the household’s ex ante identical
buyers who observe k + 1 prices (total) in the current period.
With the measures of buyers observing diﬀerent numbers of prices ﬁxed, the mechanism by
which buyers and sellers are matched is similar to the “noisy sequential search” process of Burdett
and Judd (1983) as extended to a monetary economy by Head and Kumar (2005) and Mortensen
(2005). The household knows the distribution of prices oﬀered by sellers, but individual buyers
may only purchase at a price they are quoted by a speciﬁc seller in a particular period. Let Fit(pt)
denote the cumulative distribution function (cdf), of the prices posted by all sellers in location i
at time t, and let Fit denote its support. Time subscripts are included here to indicate that this
notation refers to a distribution of nominal prices. Note that the sellers posting these prices may
be from households not of type i.
Following Mortensen (2005) (with the modiﬁcation that here we have assumed all buyers
observe at least one price quote) it is straightforward to show that the cdf of the lowest price










1 ¡ e¡ni pt 2 Fit: (2:9)
An individual buyer who purchases does so at the lowest price observed, spending xit(pt)
conditional on the price paid as instructed by the household. Buyers are constrained to spend no
more in a trading session than the money allocated to them at the beginning of the period by the
household:
xit(pt) · mit i = 1;2; pt: (2:10)
Having allocated the same quantity of money to all buyers, the household will optimally instruct
them all to behave symmetrically. Moreover, because households contain a continuum of symmet-
ric buyers, they face no uncertainty with regard to their overall trading opportunities and total








Individual sellers produce to meet the demand of the buyers who observe their price and wish
to purchase. The expected quantity of goods sold in the current period for a type i seller (of any























Note that sales depend on the conditions in the market in which the seller operates, ` in (2.12)
and (2.13). Here X`t(pt) is the spending rule of a type ` buyer, Q`k is the aggregate fraction of
type ` buyers observing k additional prices, and N` is the average search intensity of buyers in
market/location `. Also, W` is the measure of sellers in market/location ` in the current period
and is given by
W` = Z`` + Z¡``; (2:14)
where Z¡`;` is the measure of sellers chosen to visit market/location ` by households of type ¡` 6= `
in the current period.
In both (2.12) and (2.13), X`t(pt)=pt represents the quantity of goods exchanged per sale and
the bracketed term is the expected number of sales. The expected number of sales conditional on
the price posted is the expected number of times that the seller’s price will be observed and be the
lowest of the prices observed by that buyer. This is the product of the ratio of buyers to sellers in
the particular location (1=W` because the measure of buyers in each location is always one), the
total number of price observations, and the probability that of the k prices observed by any buyer,
the posted price, pt is the lowest. The algebraic steps performed in going from (2.12) to (2.13) are
similar to those taken by Mortensen (2005).
Let ˆ Fi`t(pt) be the distribution of prices posted by sellers of a type i household in mar-
ket/location ` in the current period , and let ˆ Fi`t denote its support. Since the household contains
a continuum of sellers, it faces no uncertainty with regard to its total sales in the current trading







yi`(pt)d ˆ Fi`t(pt): (2:15)
Note that expected sales in any market/location depend only on the price posted, not on the seller’s







ptyi`(pt)d ˆ Fi`t(pt): (2:16)
We then have an expression describing the law of motion for a representative type i household’s
money holdings:
mit+1 = mit ¡
Z
Fit




8A representative households money holdings going into next period’s trading session are its money
holdings at the beginning of this period minus the amount spent by its buyers plus its sellers’ sales
revenue plus the transfer received at the beginning of the next period. Note that all households
receive an equal transfer.
We now characterize households’ choices of instructions xit(pt) and ˆ Fi`t(pt), ` = 1;2, to its
buyers and sellers respectively. Consider ﬁrst the expenditure rule given to the households’ buyers,
xit(pt). The household’s gain to having a buyer exchange xit(pt) units of money for consumption
at price pt is given by the household’s marginal utility of current consumption, uc(cit) times the
quantity of consumption good purchased, xit(pt)=pt. The household’s cost of this exchange is the
number of currency units given up, xit(pt) times the marginal value of a unit of money in the
trading session of the next period, which we denote !it. Note that !it is the value of relaxing
constraint (2.17) marginally.
Individual buyers are small and the household may not reallocate money balances across buyers
once the trading session has started and they have begun to observe prices. We then have the
following proposition:





mit for pt <
uc(cit)
!it





That is, households instruct buyers to spend their entire money holdings if the lowest price they
observe is below a reservation price and to return with money holdings unspent otherwise. If the
lowest price is exactly equal to the reservation price, with some (possibly very small) probability,
², the buyer refuses to buy.3
Next, consider the household’s price posting strategies (i.e. the instructions it gives to its sell-
ers). The expected return to a type i household from having a seller post price pt in market/location













3 Choosing a small positive probability with which buyers do not trade at the reservation price (when the
household is indiﬀerent to trade) enables us to rule out a number of uninteresting equilibria. We return to this
issue in the next section.
9where again F`t(pt) is the cdf of prices posted by all sellers in market/location ` and X`t(pt) and N`
are the expenditure rule and search intensity of type ` buyers. Note that in (2.19) the components
which are speciﬁc to type i sellers are the valuation of money, !it, and the production cost, Ái,
both of which are components of the return to each sale. The probability of making a sale depends
only on the price posted and the search intensity of buyers.
It is clear from (2.19) that no type i seller would be instructed to post any price lower than
p¤
it = Ái=!it in any market, as the return to doing so is negative. Also, the return to any seller of
posting a price greater than the common reservation price of the buyers present in any market is




ri`t(pt) ´ ˆ Fi`t: (2:20)
Because households receive the same expected return from a seller who posts any price in ˆ Fi`t,
we express its instructions as a cdf, ˆ Fi`t, on support ˆ Fi`t and think of sellers as drawing their
prices randomly from this distribution. At this stage, however, we make no claims about the
characteristics of this distribution.
In addition to instructions regarding the actions of its individual members, the household must
also choose search intensity and the measure of its sellers that visit the other market. Consider ﬁrst
the former. As all buyers transact in their home market/location and the household takes as given







The household takes as given the distribution of prices posted in the market, but considers how
the distribution of the lowest price observed by its own buyers varies with search intensity, ni.
The household chooses the measures of its sellers that visit diﬀerent locations to equate the
marginal returns across markets net of participation costs. That is, to solve
max
zi`2[0;1]
ziiriit + zi;¡iri;¡it ¡ »(zi;¡i ¡ ¯ zi;¡i)º (2:22)
subject to:
zii + zi;¡i = 1: (2:23)
This problem gives rise to the following system of ﬁrst-order and complementary slackness condi-
tions:
ri;¡i ¡º»(zi;¡i ¡ ¯ zi;¡i)º¡1 ¡À · 0; zi;¡i ¸ 0; zi;¡i[ri;¡i ¡º»(zi;¡i ¡ ¯ zi;¡i)º¡1 ¡À] = 0; (2:24)
where À is a Lagrange multiplier associated (2.23).
102.3: Dynamic optimization
At time t, the relevant state variables for a representative type i household are its beginning
of period individual money holdings, mt; the distribution of money holdings across households of
diﬀerent types, M1t, M2t and ¾t. Since we consider situations in which the aggregate money stock
grows, as in (2.9) it is useful to divide all nominal variables by the economy-wide money-stock,
Mt. From this point on all nominal variables (i.e. quantities of money and prices) will have been
normalized by Mt to obtain “real” counterparts. Also, time subscripts will be suppressed in the
usual fashion when using dynamic programming.















(2:1);(2:5);(2:6);(2:8) ¡ (2:11); and (2:13) ¡ (2:17):
The household takes as given the actions of other households and the aggregate distributions of
posted prices at both relevant market/locations, all of which it treats as functions of the aggregate














¡ ¸i(p;m;M1;M2;¾) ¡ !i(m;M1;M2;¾) = 0 8p 2 Fi; (2:27)
where ¸i(p;¢) is a Lagrange multiplier on the buyers’ expenditure constraint, (2.10). The ﬁrst-order
and complimentary slackness conditions associated with the choice of zi;¡i are given by (2.24), and













¸i(p;¢)dJi(p) + !i(¢): (2:29)
11Equations (2.26)—(2.29), (2.21), and (2.24); together with the buyers’ expenditure rules,
(2.18), and the optimal price-posting conditions, (2.20), characterize a (type i) household’s op-
timal behaviour condition on its money holdings, m, the aggregate state, (M1;M2;¾), and its
beliefs regarding the actions of other households.
3. Equilibrium
We consider only equilibria that are symmetric and Markov. By symmetric, we mean that in
equilibrium all households of the same type make the same choices and thus have the same money
holdings and the same marginal valuation of money, Ωit in all periods. By Markov, we mean that
the quantitites, Cit and Yit, search intensity, Nit, the allocation of sellers across market/locations,
Z1
2t and Z2
1t, and the distributions of real prices (i.e. nominal prices divided by the per household
money stock, Mt), are all time invariant functions of the aggregate state, (M1;M2;¾), which itself
is Markov, evolving according to (2.7) and (2.19)
In such an equilibrium, if one exists, all buyers of a given type have common reservation prices







where all nominal variables have been normalized by the aggregate money stock, Mt. In order for
(3.1) to be satisﬁed, must depend only on the aggregate state. If conditional on (M1;M2;¾), all
nominal prices are proportional to the aggregate money stock M, then there exist state-contingent
(but time invariant) distributions of real posted prices characterized by supports Fi(M1;M2;¾) ´
fpt=Mt;pt 2 Fit; for all t such that the state is given by (M1;M2;¾), and conditional cdf’s:
Fi(pjM1;M2¾) = Fit(pt) 8p 2 Fi(M1;M2¾): (3:2)
If conditional distributions satisfying (3.2) exist, then we may think of buyer as observing real price
quotes, and deﬁne conditional distributions of lowest real prices observed:
Ji(pjM1;M2;¾) =
1 ¡ Nie¡NiFi(pjM1;M2;¾)
1 ¡ e¡Ni : (3:3)
We then have the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition: A symmetric monetary equilibrium (SME) is a collection of time-invariant, type-
speciﬁc household choices, ni(m:M1;M2¾), zi;¡i(¢), xi(p;¢). ˆ Fi`(p;¢) m; common expenditure rules,
Xi(p;M1;M2;¾), search intensities, Ni(¢), seller allocations, Zi;¡i(¢), and distributions of posted
prices, Fi(p;¢), for all i;` = 1;2 such that:
121. Taking as given the distributions of posted prices, Fi(p;¢), common expenditure rules, Xi(p;¢),
allocation of sellers, Zi;¡i(¢), and search intensities, Ni(¢). representative households of each
type choose ni, m0, xi(p), zi;¡i, and the price distributions ˆ Fi`(p) to satisfy the household
Bellman equation, (2.25).
2. For both types, individual choices equal their per household counterparts: ni = Ni(M1;M2;¾),
zi;¡i = Zi;¡i(¢), xi(p) = Xi(pj¢), individual household money holdings equal average holdings
for each type, mi = Mi(¢), and the distributions of prices posted at each market/location are
compositions of the distributions posted by sellers from the various types. That is, they are
given by
Fi(pj¢) = F1i(j¢) + F2i(j¢) 8p 2 Fi(¢): (3:4)
3. Money has value in all states:
For all (M1;M2;¾), Fi(pj¢) > 0 for some i = 1;2 and some p < 1.
In characterizing an SME for this economy, we begin by operating under the assumptions that
such an equilibrium exists and that eﬀort to obtain additional price quotes (Ni for i = 1;2) is
strictly positive in both markets for all states. We then derive restrictions that such an equilibrium
must satisfy under these assumptions. We then demonstrate both that such an equilibrium exists
and that any SME by the deﬁnition above must exhibit Ni(¢) > 0 for all states.
Under the assumption that an SME with these properties exists, key quantities describing the
equilibrium are the households’ marginal valuations of money, Ωi(¢), as these determine the returns
to both buyers and sellers from transacting at a particular price in each state. Returning to the




























We thus associate an SME with two functions Ωi(¢) for i = 1;2. Note to begin with that Ωi depends
on the future distribution of money holdings across households, M0
1;M0
2, through the presence of
M0
i in the denominator. This will be the source of short-run monetary non-neutrality.
13Still under the assumption that an SME exists, we may then establish certain properties which
it must exhibit. First, consider households’ price-posting behaviour ˆ Fi
i0(pj¢) conditional on their
beliefs regarding buyers’ search intensity in the two markets, N1 and N2. To begin with we have the
following proposition adapted from both Burdett and Judd (1983) and Head and Kumar (2005):
Proposition 2: If an SME exists in which Ni > 0 for i = 1;2 in all states, then the distributions of
posted prices in each market must be non-degenerate and continuous on connected supports.
This proposition establishes two basic aspects of the equilibria that we consider. First, there is
price dispersion in all states. Second there are neither gaps in the support of the price distributions
nor any mass points rendering the distributions discontinuous.
A second proposition characterizes the eﬀects of heterogeneity among sellers that may be
present in any market location in an SME.
Proposition 3: In an SME, in any state a seller whose costs (measured by Ái=!i) are lower than
those of another seller (Ái0) will post only prices that are below those of the higher cost seller.
This proposition is adapted from Mortensen (2003) and establishes that in any market, the support
of the distribution of posted prices will be divided into two regions, with the lower cost sellers posting
below the higher cost ones. Note, however, that from Proposition 2 there can be no gap in the
overall support of the price distribution in any market/location. Since costs will diﬀer across sellers
in all states in which types diﬀer in any respect, situations with high and low cost sellers by this
deﬁnition are norm (i.e. they occur generically).4 Thus, in any state, households may be classiﬁed
as low cost and high cost, and so it is useful to refer to “low” and “high” cost types of households,
which we will distiniguish with subscripts, “L” and “H”, respectively.
Using Propositions 1, 2, and 3, we may then construct expressions for the distributions of
posted prices that must arise in any SME as functions of the marginal valuations of ﬁat money,
Ωi, i = 1;2. First, combining households’ expenditure rules (2.20) with (2.22) we have that in any
SME the support of the distribution of posted prices in market/location i must be contained in the
interval [p¤









4 In situations in which all sellers are identical in all respects, the symmetry conditions in the deﬁnition of an
SME require them to behave identically.
14with ÁL=ΩL representing the real marginal cost of the lower cost seller. Note that the sellers’ costs
do not depend on which market they are selling in.
The upper support of the distribution of posted prices is given by the reservation price ¯ pi of
the buyers in that market since a positive measure, e¡Ni, of buyers observes a single price. If the
upper support of the price distribution were below ¯ pi, any household can proﬁtably deviate by
having all of its sellers post ¯ pi. This clearly is not consistent with equilibrium.
Making use of Propositions 2 and 3, we may then write out the following set of four equations
characterizing the “equal proﬁt” conditions governing the supports of the distributions of prices


























i = 1;2: (3:8)
In (3.8) the ﬁrst (two) equations establish that all prices posted by low cost sellers in each market
must generate equal proﬁts. In this equation ¯ pL
i represents the maximal price charged by low cost
sellers in market i and Vi = Fi(¯ pL
i ), the value of the cdf of posted prices in market-location i at





where ZLi and ZHi denote the measures of low and high cost sellers present in market/location
i. Note that in states in which one households diﬀer by costs it is sometimes also useful to refer
to the market in which the buyers come from low-cost households the “low” market, etc. Finally,
note that (3.8) reﬂects the result that the highest price posted by the low cost sellers is equal to
the lowest price posted by the high cost sellers.
The system of equations (3.8) may then be straightforwardly solved for the following expres-
sions for the distributions of prices posted by both high and low cost sellers in each market-location
in any SME:

































i = 1;2: (3:10)






FHi(p) if p 2 (¯ pL
it; ¯ pi]
FLi(p) if p · ¯ pL
i .
i = 1;2: (3:11)
Given that by Proposition 3 the supports of high and low cost sellers do not overlap, (3.11) is
consistent with (3.4). Finally, note that the distribution of transactions prices in each market
location is given by (2.11) evaluated at the appropriate distribution in (3.11):
Ji(p) =
1 ¡ Nie¡NiFi(p)
1 ¡ e¡Ni : (3:12)
An important aspect of the evolution of the distribution of money holdings across household
types is apparent by comparing (3.10) and (3.11). Because low cost sellers make more sales than
their high cost competitors, they will collect money in greater proportion to their numbers in
either market. The magnitude of the ﬂows of money between diﬀerent types of households is thus
determined not only by the relative numbers of sellers present in each market, but also by the
search intensities of the buyers present. The latter determines the extent to which the distribution
of transactions prices diﬀers from that of posted prices. We now turn to the determination of search
intensity and the degree of participation in the “foreign” market, making use of the restrictions
(3.8)—(3.12) on the distributions of posted and transactions prices in an SME.
To this point we have assumed that in equilibrium the expected number of additional price
quotes observed by all buyers in an SME is always interior. We now have the following proposition
establishing that this is indeed true.
Proposition 4: For any strictly positive probability with which buyers do not exchange at the
reservation price (i.e. for any ² > 0) there exists a search cost parameter, ¹ low enough that
Ni > 0 for all i in all states in any SME.
This proposition eliminates the possibility that buyers and sellers will coordinate on strategies such
that in some states and market-locations buyers do not search at all (Ni = 0) and all buyers charge
the reservation (“monopoly”) price. Note that even if ² = 0, there can be no monetary equilibrium
in which Ni = 0 in all states (Head, Kumar, and Lapham (2005)).
Given Proposition 4, the optimal choice of search intensity in each state is implicitly charac-





16where Ci is given by (3.1). Note that in choosing ni each household takes the distribution of posted
prices, Fi(p), as given, but considers how its expected transactions prices change with its search
intensity. As in Mortensen (2005), system (3.13) (which is algebraically messy) cannot be solved
analytically for N1 and N2. It can, however, be solved numerically in each state given Ωi for
i = 1;2.
Next we turn to the determination of participation in the “foreign” market. Here we simply
























i = 1;2: (3:14)
Then, under the assumption of interior solutions, (2.24) may be written:
rii ¡ ri;¡i = º»(zi;¡i ¡ ¯ zi;¡i)º¡1; i = 1;2: (3:15)
For now we maintain the assumption of an interior solution. We have the following (as yet unproven)
conjecture:
Conjecture 5: Under certain conditions, there exists an SME in which in all states where households
are heterogenous, choices of participation in the foreign market are interior for both types.
This proposition is certainly true, as we can produce examples of such equilibria. What remains
to be derived here are the “certain conditions”.
At this point we can combine several expressions to write out the laws of motion for money



































It can be seen that both participation in the foreign and the degree of search intensity aﬀect the
rate at which money ﬂows between households of diﬀerent types. Participation aﬀects the rate at
17which sellers prices are observed by households of the other type. Search intensity aﬀects the share
of sales going to the lower cost sellers in both markets.
Using (3.16) it is possible to compare the economy to that of Williamson (2005). In William-
son’s economy, the rate at which members of the two types of households meet, ¼ in his notation,
plays a role analogous to the participation rates in our economy. The relative sizes of the two types,
® in his economy, plays a role in some sense similar to that of search intensity here, which determines
the relative numbers of transactions in which the two (equal sized here) types of households engage.
A key diﬀerence between our economy and Williamson’s is that ® and ¼ are exogenous parameters
in his economy, whereas in ours both search intensity and the degree to which sellers participate in
foreign markets are endogenous.
Because participation is endogenous and could equal zero in some states, stability of the
distribution of money holdings in a stochastic equilibrium is an issue. At this stage we have not
derived explicit conditions for ergodicity. We have, however, generated examples in which the
distribution is stable, and we consider one in the next section.
4. An Example
In this section we present a particular example that is illustrative of the type of dynamics that
may result from a shock to the money growth rate when types are heterogeneous. In our economy,
even if types are entirely symmetric, diﬀerent realizations of the production disutility parameters,
Á1 and Á2 will cause them to have diﬀerent money holdings at any point in time. Whenever types
hold diﬀerent fractions of the money stock, lump-sum monetary injections of the type considered
here will be non-neutral. In order to isolate the eﬀects of particular shocks, however, we restrict
the environment in a number of ways.
First, we assume that households are diﬀerent with regard to their cost parameters and hold
these parameters ﬁxed. In particular, we will let type 1 be the low cost household in all periods by
setting Á1 = ÁL < Á2 = ÁH. In all other respects types are identical. In this way, we can construct
an example in which in all periods, type 1 sellers are the low-cost sellers in both markets, and
market 1 contains only buyers from low-cost households. The following table lists the parameters
for this example:
Parameters for an asymmetric example
® = 1:5 Curvature in preferences
¯ = :99 Discount factor
18¹ = :0015 Search cost
° = 1:0062 Money creation
¯ zi
¡i = :2 Presence in “foreign” market
ÁL = :16 Low cost disutility
ÁH = :2 High cost disutility
To begin with we consider a steady-state monetary equilibrium with these parameters, by
which we mean that both the cost parameters and money growth rate are constant over time. In
this economy, the inﬂation rate is constant and equal to the money growth rate, 2.5%, at “annual
rates” (i.e over four periods given ¯ = :99). With zi;¡i = :2, the measures of sellers of each type
operating in their “home market” is close to eighty percent. This reﬂects relatively high costs of
varying participation in the foreign market away from ¯ zi;¡i.
The steady-state equilibrium of the economy described by these parameter values has the
following general characteristics:
1. The low cost households consume more than their high cost counterparts and have larger
money holdings.
2. They also have higher markups than high cost sellers even though they charge lower prices by
Proposition 3.
3. Because they have higher consumption, their value of search is lower and so they search less
intensely than their high cost counterparts.
4. Average markups (both within and across markets) are therefore higher (20%) for low cost
sellers than for high cost sellers (10%) so that the average markup in the entire economy is
roughly 15%.
For our purposes, the most important aspect of the steady-state is the distribution of money
across types. In this example, M1 = ML = :55 in the steady-state, whereas M2 = MH = :45. Thus,
a lump-sum monetary injection will raise the holdings of high cost households by more than those
of low cost ones. In the steady-state, however, the fact that low cost sellers make more sales than
their high cost counterparts accounts for the fact that the money holdings return to this invariant
19distribution each period in spite of the fact that there is money creation each period through equal
lump-sum transfers.
We now consider the following experiment, intended to match that in conducted in the baseline
economy of Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2004): The economy is initially in its steady-
state, and then experiences an increase of the money growth rate equal to two percent of its average
value. The money growth rate then returns to its long-run value with an autocorrelation of .24.
Figures 1-4 depict the responses of money holdings, search intensity, inﬂation, and consumption to
this shock.
Considering ﬁrst Figure 1, note that the shock initially drives money holdings closer together,
raising the low money holdings of the high cost sellers and lowering the high money holdings of
the low cost sellers. After one period, however, relative money holdings begin to return to their
long run level. Money holdings overshoot, however, and eventually return to their long run level
from a distribution that is more dispersed than in the steady-state. The particular pattern here
appears (based on other experiments) to be typical, but not exclusive. That is, in some cases
money holdings are disturbed from their long-run distribution and return monotonically to the
steady-state. In all cases, however, the distribution of money holdings evolves over many periods,
remaining out of the steady-state long after money growth has returned to its long-run level.
To understand both the adjustment of the distribution of money holdings and movements in
prices, it is useful to consider the response of search intensity to the shock. In Figure 2 it can be
seen that search intensity rises in the market with low-cost buyers and falls (but by much less) in
the other market. These movements in search intensity can be understood by considering the fact
that other things equal, an increase in the money growth rate tends to raise real prices only to
the extent that it signals that money will be worth less in the future. Since the increase in money
growth here is not very persistent, we will treat the direct eﬀect of the shock on real prices as small,
For those households who ﬁnd their money holdings high as a result of the shock (the high
cost household), as long as the increase in real prices due to the inﬂation tax is small, the return
to search is diminished as marginal utility falls due to increased purchasing power. Thus search
intensity falls for the high cost agents, but rises for low cost agents for symmetric reasons; their
money holdings have fallen.
Changes in search intensity aﬀect the ﬂows of money across household types by altering the
fraction of sales that low-type sellers make to high cost buyers and that high-type sellers make to
low cost buyers. The movements in search intensity depicted here reduce the number of transactions
across types in both markets. Since low-cost buyers have high money holdings relative to high cost
20buyers (even though the gap is smaller than in the steady-state) the increase in transactions of
this type can serve to push the money holdings apart, that is back toward their steady-state levels.
Or, it could not. The path of money holdings depends on the relative magnitudes of the shift in
the fraction of transactions that occur and of the diﬀerences in the size of money holdings across
household types. For this reason, diﬀerent patterns for the adjustment of money holdings can
occur in diﬀerent circumstances. It does not appear, however, that the particular pattern is of
much importance for aggregate dynamics. What is important, is that the distribution of money
holdings is disturbed from the steady-state for a long time.
With regard to the dynamics of inﬂation, a key relationship is the magnitude of the responses
of search intensity in the two markets. An increase in search intensity in the low cost market lowers
markups, limiting price increases. In contrast, the reduction in search intensity in the high cost
market is associated with an increase in markups. Since in this example the former dominates,
we might expect that the average markup falls, generating a reduction in real prices on average
and inﬂation that is less than the increase in the money stock. Considering Figure 3 we can see
that this is exactly what happens in the initial period. In subsequent periods, however, it can be
the case that the deviations of search intensity and markups from their steady-state levels are not
enough to lower real prices in the presence of a greater money supply. In the example depicted
here it can be seen that in subsequent periods inﬂation exceeds the growth rate of the money stock
as the economy returns to the steady-state.
Finally, considering Figure 4 it is clear that the shock is expansionary overall as it raises the
relatively high consumption of the low-cost types by more than it reduces that of the high-cost
types. Thus, aggregate consumption is increased for many periods following the shock.
From the preceding discussion, it is clear that a money shock of this type generates a number
of eﬀects which determine the dynamics of inﬂation and the degree of short-run non-neutrality.
Since these eﬀects to some extent conﬂict with each other, dynamics are really a quantitative issue
and thus we cannot conclude much on the basis of an example. This example is suﬃcient, however,
to demonstrate that the following results are possible in our economy:
1. An increase in the money stock is in general non-neutral in the short-run and could result in
movements in aggregate consumption for a signiﬁcant period of time.
2. The response of search intensity to movements in the distribution of money holdings can
generate muted responses of the price level (i.e. price stickiness) to monetary shocks.
213. Inﬂation may display more persistence than the money growth rate.
These qualitative aspects of the response to money shocks appear to be typical in our economy.
Therefore, our future work will focus on quantifying the eﬀects of such shocks in our economy.
5. Further Work
Our further work on this project will focus mainly on developing quantitative results. To this
end we need to solve the model globally (rather than locally around a particular steady-state)
and generate the statistical properties of the economy in response to both money growth and cost
shocks. For this we will use the state-space discretization method employed by Molico and Zhang
(2005). Solutions, however, are much easier to obtain in our environment than in theirs because
our distribution of money holdings can be summarized by a single variable, M1=M2.
Having generated a complete dynamic characterization of at least one example, there are two
further aspects of the work. First, on the theoretical front, establishing general conditions under
which stable dynamic equilibria exist. Second, choosing parameters to calibrate the economy so
that its quantitative predictions are useful. To begin with, we will replicate the experiment of a
monetary policy shock in the model of Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2004).
Finally, there are a number of extensions that might help to make the model quantitative. For
example, households could participate in a ﬁnancial market preceding the opening of the trading
session in which they decide how much money to carry into trading as opposed to holding as
bonds. We would expect this to have quantitative eﬀects, but not to change the overall character
of the dynamics. As long as households are heterogeneous at least in the short-run, money will be
non-neutral and inﬂation will deviate from the money growth rate with some degree of persistence.
In the examples we have considered so far, dynamics are dominated by movements in search
intensity rather than in the degree of participation. We have so far only considered small shocks
in a neighborhood of a stable steady-state, and these shocks simply do not cause participation to
move around much. In extensions we will consider larger and perhaps more persistent shocks to
examine the role of endogenous participation in dynamics.
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Figure 4:  Consumption